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We investigate large-scale effects induced by external fields, phenomenologically interpreted as
mass media, in multiagent models evolving with the microscopic dynamics of the binary naming
game. In particular, we show that a single external field, broadcasting information at regular
time intervals, can reverse the majority opinion of the population, provided the frequency and the
effectiveness of the sent messages lie above well-defined thresholds. We study the phase structure
of the model in the mean field approximation and in numerical simulations with several network
topologies. We also investigate the influence on the agent dynamics of two competing external fields,
periodically broadcasting different messages. In finite regions of the parameter space we observe
periodic equilibrium states in which the average opinion densities are reversed with respect to naive
expectations. Such equilibria occur in two cases: (i) when the frequencies of the competing messages
are different but close to each other; (ii) when the frequencies are equal and the relative time shift
of the messages does not exceed half a period. We interpret the observed phenomena as a result
of the interplay between the external fields and the internal dynamics of the agents and conclude
that, depending on the model parameters, the naming game is consistent with scenarios of first- or
second-mover advantage (to borrow an expression from the jargon of business strategy).
I. INTRODUCTION
The cultural debate on the role of media in modern so-
cieties has received contributions from social and behav-
ioral sciences as well as from the humanities in the past
century. Following the advent of network science [1], the
influence of mass communication on opinions, attitudes
and actions of people has likewise attracted the interest of
scholars working in statistical mechanics of complex sys-
tems. As known, at the heart of this research field lies a
great variety of agent-based models, specifically designed
to quantitatively explore diversified aspects of diffusive
phenomena, such as the spread of opinions across social
networks (see Ref. [2] for a review). It is remarkable that
many such models display convergence to a macroscopic
consensus state, in which all agents share the same opin-
ion as an ultimate consequence of their local interactions.
Investigating whether and how the path to consensus is
favored or hampered by the presence of media has been
the subject of a significant body of research in various
∗ filippo.palombi@enea.it
theoretical setups. Yet, the up-to-date analysis is still
limited to a partial subset of the models populating the
scientific literature.
The matter has been recently reviewed in Ref. [3].
Here, agent-based models are classified into groups with
one-dimensional or multidimensional opinions and mod-
els within each group are then further divided depending
on whether opinions are discrete or continuous. Relevant
studies of the influence of media on opinion dynamics in-
clude Refs. [4–10] (one-dimensional discrete models), [11–
16] (one-dimensional continuous models), [17–27] (multi-
dimensional discrete models) and [28–30] (multidimen-
sional continuous models). In all of these studies, media
are represented as an external source of information, var-
iously affecting the internal dynamics of the agents.
A quick glance to the above literature is sufficient to
realize that external fields have never been considered
in the context of multiagent models expressly conceived
to study the emergence of spoken languages, except for
Ref. [10] (see below). The naming game (NG) is the sim-
plest and most popular of such models. Inspired by the
pioneering work of Refs. [31, 32], it was first proposed
in Ref. [33] after several attempts had been previously
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before interaction after interaction
S→ L S− L
A
A→ A A− A
A
A→ B A− AB
A
A→ AB A− A
B
B→ A B− AB
B
B→ B B− B
B
B→ AB B− B
AB
A→ A A− A
AB
A→ B AB− AB
AB
A→ AB A− A
AB
B→ A AB− AB
AB
B→ B B− B
AB
B→ AB B− B
(b)
Fig. 1 – [color online] (a) NG interaction flowchart; (b) table of interactions (S = speaker, L = listener).
made to ascribe the origin of language conventions to
evolutionary mechanisms [34–39]. The NG is a language
game in the sense of Ref. [40]. Its goal is to name an
initially unnamed object. Each agent partaking in the
game is endowed with a notebook, in which he/she writes
names. Elementary interactions involve two agents, play-
ing respectively as speaker and listener. In each interac-
tion, the speaker is chosen randomly among the agents,
while the listener is chosen randomly among the speaker’s
neighbors. The binary version of the model, introduced
in Ref. [41], assumes only two competing names, conven-
tionally denoted by letters A and B. In this case, the
basic interaction rule is equivalently described by either
the flowchart reported in Fig. 1 (a) or the table reported
in Fig. 1 (b). An in-depth bibliographic analysis of arti-
cles concerning the NG would take up this whole paper,
since a considerable literature was produced on the sub-
ject over the past decade. To avoid this, we refer the
reader to Ref. [42], where a recent review of the model is
provided.
The aim of this work is to investigate the influence of
media on language dynamics.1 More precisely, we study
their effects on a population of agents playing the binary
NG. There are at least three good reasons for doing this.
(i) Languages never remain static. They keep on evolv-
ing in various ways, e.g.via the introduction of neologisms
that describe tools, concepts and so forth, first entering
common use. In modern societies media may favor or
discourage the adoption of a given neologism, either di-
rectly or indirectly. Take, for example, the verb tweet.
An anecdote concerning it circulates on the Web. In
2010, P. B. Corbett, standards editor at the NYT, ad-
1Throughout the paper we use interchangeably the terms media and
external field(s).
vised his colleagues to abstain from using that word in
news articles in the social-networking sense. As he wrote
in his blog, “I had suggested that outside of ornithological
contexts, tweet should still be treated as colloquial rather
than as standard English. It can be used for special ef-
fect, or in places where a colloquial tone is appropriate,
but should not be used routinely in straight news arti-
cles.” [43]. Corbett’s position, once it became of public
domain, triggered a swift and widespread negative reac-
tion outside the NYT, as he himself observed. The epi-
logue of the story is well known: Corbett’s opposers had
the best. Despite the cascade effects that the opinion of
an influential NYT editor might have had on journalists
throughout the world, the verb tweet, which was already
in the Oxford English Dictionary in relation to the chirp
of small birds, got an additional definition in the June
2013 release [44]. This marked the end of the debate.
(ii) The application domain of the NG goes beyond the
mere understanding of how language conventions arise. If
we interpret letters A and B as opposite arguments rather
than as names, one argument being in favor of and one
against a given choice, we can regard an agent in state
A or B as one who has made the choice (A and B are
certainty states) and an agent in state AB as one who
has not made it yet and holds both arguments for fur-
ther consideration (AB is an uncertainty state). In other
words, language dynamics is a valid example of discrete
opinion dynamics.2 It is natural to represent media in
2Notice that the notion of opinion uncertainty conveyed by the
agent state AB is different from the one characterizing bounded
confidence models, such as the Deffuant-Weisbuch [45] or the
Hegselmann-Krause [46] ones. While in the NG an agent in state
AB can interact with a neighbor independently of the latter’s
state, in bounded confidence models the uncertainty, measured by
a bounded confidence parameter, determines which neighbors of an
agent are allowed to interact with him/her.
3this framework as an external force favoring one opinion,
say opinion A, and acting on the agents so as to (a) instill
uncertainty into those adopting opinion B and (b) con-
vince the uncertain ones to abandon opinion B. There are
plenty of real-life situations where such dichotomous dy-
namics occur in first approximation. Just as a reference
example the reader may consider the longstanding debate
concerning the legitimacy of the European institutions.
Since several years EU political elites are addressing the
problem of how improving the level of acceptance of the
European governance among citizens. The issue of the
EU legitimacy has been the subject of scholarly research
(see, for instance, Refs. [47–50]). Specifically, the poten-
tial impact of the media coverage in the EU legitimacy
process has been discussed in Refs. [51–54]. If, in the
framework of the NG, we represent citizens supporting
the EU institutions as agents in state A and citizens op-
posing to them as agents in state B, then we are naturally
led to investigate the extent to which a media campaign
promoting opinion A is able to globally influence the pop-
ulation.
(iii) Theoretical predictions for how the speed of con-
vergence to consensus depends upon the connectivity of
agents playing the NG have been recently put to the test
in Web-based live games with controlled design and have
been shown to correctly reproduce experimental obser-
vations [55]. It is tempting to conjecture that the corre-
spondence between model and real world is preserved also
when one or more external fields influence the process of
consensus formation. If this is correct, what does the NG
have to tell us about exogenously directed consensus?
It must be observed that in most of the literature re-
viewed in Ref. [3] the strength of media is described by
a constant parameter α ∈ (0, 1), measuring the proba-
bility that an agent selected at a given microscopic time
interacts with the external source of information rather
than with a neighbor. A significant exception is found in
Refs. [11, 13], where media act on the agent dynamics as a
periodic perturbation affecting instantaneously the whole
population. There is an interpretative difference between
these two approaches. In the former, for any macroscopic
time interval ∆T a fraction α∆T > 0 is spent by agents in
asynchronous interactions with media; in the latter, the
internal dynamics controls the system with no external
influence between any two subsequent impulsive pertur-
bations, i.e., in practice it rules all the macroscopic time
up to zero-measure intervals. Broadly speaking, the first
approach suggests a picture where agents leave TV (or
radio) switched on and watch (or listen to) it from time to
time, whereas the second one describes a situation where
short messages of an advertising campaign are sent on
TV (or radio) at peak hours of the day, when a large
fraction of the population is watching (or listening to) it.
In the example of the EU legitimacy, it would seem more
natural to investigate the effects on European societies of
a media campaign promoting the EU institutions or, in
consideration of the recent rise of Euro-sceptic political
movements and parties in several European countries, to
study the hypothetical clash of two different media cam-
paigns respectively promoting and denigrating the EU.
With this in mind, we choose to follow the approach
of Refs. [11, 13]. The other one has been discussed in
Ref. [10] in the specific case of agents playing the NG on
empirical community-based networks.
To summarize the key points of our study, we first con-
sider a setup in which all agents are initially in state B
and media broadcast messages advertising opinion A at
regular macroscopic time intervals. We find that the me-
dia campaign is able to convert the whole population to
opinion A within a finite macroscopic time only provided
frequency and effectiveness of the advertising messages lie
above specific thresholds. In other words, under proper
conditions, the action of media induces a sharp transition
in the NG dynamics from a phase where opposite opin-
ions stay forever in a state of periodic equilibrium to one
where consensus on opinion A is reached within a finite
time. We study the critical line of this phase transition
in the mean field approximation and compare analytic
estimates with numerical simulations. Then, we con-
sider a different setup, in which equal fractions of agents
are initially in states A and B and two competing media
broadcast messages advertising, respectively, opinions A
and B at regular macroscopic time intervals. We study
how the equilibrium of the system depends on the rela-
tive frequency, the relative effectiveness, and the relative
time shift of the media campaigns. We find that periodic
equilibria exist, in which the average opinion densities are
reversed with respect to what one would naively expect.
Such states occur either when the frequencies of the com-
peting messages are different but sufficiently close to each
other, or when the frequencies are equal and the relative
time shift of the messages does not exceed half a period.
We argue that these states provide an explicit realization
of a general scenario known to marketing strategists, in
which the first entrant in a market is not able to capi-
talize on its advantage, thus leaving a new entrant the
chance to compete more effectively and take dominance
(second-mover advantage). This feature of the NG dy-
namics has never been noticed in the literature so far, to
the best of our knowledge. We give an interpretation of
4before interaction after interaction
M→ L M− L
A
A→A A−A with prob. 1
A
A→ B A−AB with prob. αB
A
A→AB A−A with prob. αAB
TABLE I – Table of media-listener interactions
(M = media, L = listener).
it in terms of the interplay between the external fields
and the internal dynamics of the agents.
II. PHASE TRANSITION INDUCED BY A
SINGLE EXTERNAL FIELD
We consider N agents, lying on the nodes of a graph
(with edges representing acquaintances) and playing the
binary NG. Each agent is assumed to be initially in
state B. We represent media as an additional fictitious
agent M connected to the whole population, taking part
in the game and invariably carrying opinion A. When
interacting, media always play the role of speaker. A
media-agent interaction results in a change of the agent’s
state: agents in state B switch to state AB with prob-
ability αB; agents in state AB switch to state A with
probability αAB; agents carrying opinion A retain it after
the interaction. These rules are summarized in Table I
for the reader’s convenience. Often in the sequel we re-
fer to αB and αAB as the effectiveness parameters of the
media campaign.3 As mentioned in Sec. I, we assume
that media act like an impulsive periodic perturbation of
the internal dynamics of the system, reaching instanta-
neously all agents. We let T = τN be the period of the
campaign. If we define a sweep as a number N of micro-
scopic interactions (each agent plays as speaker once in a
sweep on average) and take it as a macroscopic time unit,
then τ ≥ 1 represents the macroscopic period. In this
model, the media action is parametrized by the 3-tuple
(αB, αAB, ν), where ν = 1/τ is the macroscopic frequency.
We also assume that media send the first message at time
t = 0. Accordingly, all subsequent messages are sent at
macroscopic times t` = `τ for ` = 1, 2, 3, . . . . Although
the model is well defined for τ < 1 too, we consider only
macroscopic periods in the sequel.
3In the context of the NG the idea of introducing probabilities ruling
the outcome of an interaction was first considered in Ref. [41].
A. Mean field equations
We begin our study from the mean field approximation.
In principle, this is expected to correctly reproduce re-
sults of numerical simulations on a complete graph (CG)
in the thermodynamic limit, i.e., for N → ∞. In this
limit, stochastic fluctuations become fully negligible. To
describe the state of the system at a given time, we in-
troduce opinion densities
nX(t) =
no. of agents in state X at time t
N
, (II.1)
with X = A, B, AB . In the mean field approximation,
nX(t) is interpreted as an average over different realiza-
tions of the dynamics at time t. The opinion densities
fulfill a simplex constraint, viz.,
nA(t) + nB(t) + nAB(t) = 1 , for all t ≥ 0 . (II.2)
It follows that one of them is redundant. In the sequel we
choose nA(t) and nB(t) as independent quantities, hence,
we obtain nAB(t) from Eq. (II.2). The rate of change of
the opinion densities results from a balance of positive
and negative contributions arising from microscopic in-
teractions. Mean field equations (MFEs) quantify this
balance. The case with no media was first examined in
Ref. [41] and is well known. Media-agent interactions
generate additional contributions of impulsive nature, al-
tering the balance only for t = t`. As such, they are
mathematically represented by Dirac delta distributions.
MFEs describing the complete system read as
n˙A =
(
1− nA − 2nB + n2B
)
+αAB (1− nA − nB) δ (tmod τ) ,
n˙B =
(
1− nB − 2nA + n2A
)
−αB nB δ (tmod τ) .
(II.3)
We aim at solving them with initial conditions
nA(0) = 0 , nB(0) = 1 . (II.4)
The reader will notice that we could have equivalently
described media contributions by Dirac delta functions∑∞
`=0 δ(t− t`). The latter expression is more general in
that it applies also when the impulsive perturbation oc-
curs at arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily periodic) times.
We remark that the introduction of media breaks explic-
itly the exchange symmetry nA ↔ nB characterizing the
original model.
5Ordinary differential equations with state-dependent
impulsive perturbations are rather common in applied
research, e.g., they are found in control theory [56–62],
neuroscience [63, 64], etc. Such equations must be care-
fully managed because the product of a Dirac delta and
a discontinuous function is ill defined in a distributional
sense. To make this point clear, we observe that ac-
cording to Eqs. (II.3) nX(t) evolves continuously from
nX(t
+
`−1) to nX(t
−
` ) for ` ∈ N, then it jumps to nX(t+` ).
The jump amounts to αAB(1−nA−nB)(t`) for X = A and
to−αBnB(t`) for X = B. Unfortunately, neither nA(t`) nor
nB(t`) are well defined. This gives rise to an interpreta-
tive ambiguity that is expected to become significant for
αB ' 1 and/or αAB ' 1, i.e., when the components of the
perturbation are at their highest level. Several mathe-
matical aspects of impulsive differential equations were
originally discussed in Refs. [65, 66], but the effects of
the ambiguity were first highlighted and quantified only
in Ref. [64], by means of specific examples. In that paper,
it was proposed to replace each δ(t− t`) by a continuous
function δη(t−t`) approaching δ(t−t`) in the limit η → 0,
and to take this limit only after analytic integration. It
was also shown in a case study that the limiting solu-
tion thus obtained is independent of the specific shape of
δη(t− t`). Owing to this kind of robustness, the prescrip-
tion of Ref. [64] appears to be the best approach, known
in literature, for solving differential equations with im-
pulsive terms.
Unfortunately, we cannot mimic Ref. [64] because no
analytic solution to Eqs. (II.3) is known for αB = αAB =
0, owing to the non-linear character of the agent-agent
interactions. We can only pursue a numerical solution of
the complete equations. In view of the above discussion,
we should replace the Dirac delta function δ(tmod τ) by
a smooth counterpart δη(tmod τ), then we should inte-
grate the equations according to some numerical scheme
with finite integration step dt =  and we should finally
perform the double limit η,  → 0 numerically in the
specified order. This turns out to be computationally
expensive, hence, we choose to proceed differently. In
particular, we find that discrepancies produced by dif-
ferent numerical integration schemes, corresponding to
different interpretations of the impulsive terms, are ac-
ceptably small. To integrate Eqs. (II.3) numerically, we
let τ = τ  and accordingly t` = ` τ  for some τ ∈ N.
Then, we replace
• n˙X(t)→ nX(t+ )− nX(t)

, (II.5)
• δ(t− t`)→ 1

δt/,t`/ , (II.6)
with δab denoting the Kronecker symbol. An explicit
integration scheme is represented by the recurrence
nA (t+ ) = nA (t) +  ·
(
1− nA − 2nB + n2B
)
(t)
+αAB (1− nA − nB) (t) δt/,t`/ ,
nB (t+ ) = nB (t) +  ·
(
1− nB − 2nA + n2A
)
(t)
−αBnB(t) δt/,t`/ ,
(II.7)
while a (partially) implicit scheme is given by
nA (t+ ) = nA (t) +  ·
(
1− nA − 2nB + n2B
)
(t)
+αAB (1− nA − nB) (t+ ) δt/,t`/ ,
nB (t+ ) = nB (t) +  ·
(
1− nB − 2nA + n2A
)
(t)
−αBnB(t+ ) δt/,t`/ ,
(II.8)
both of them being defined for t = 0, , 2, . . . . Formally,
the difference between Eqs. (II.7) and (II.8) is just that in
the former the solution at time t+  appears only on the
left-hand side, while in the latter it appears on both sides.
In practice, opinion densities in impulsive terms are eval-
uated just before the spike in the explicit scheme and
just after it in the implicit one, hence, the two methods
are substantially different in relation to how they resolve
the ambiguity of the impulsive terms. For many ordinary
differential equations, explicit and implicit schemes con-
verge as → 0. This is not the case with Eqs. (II.7) and
(II.8). As an example, in Fig. 2 we plot nA(t) and nB(t)
vs. t for αB = αAB = 0.3 and for a handful of values
of τ (in the plot we have  = 5.0 × 10−4 and essentially
no difference is observed for smaller ). Continuous lines
correspond to the explicit scheme, while dashed lines cor-
respond to the implicit one. We see that discrepancies
exist, although they are of limited size. For larger values
of αB and αAB, the behavior of the opinion densities is
still qualitatively the same in both schemes, yet we find
that divergences gradually increase. We stress that our
main motivation for studying the system in the mean field
approximation is to gain analytic insight into its dynam-
ics. Since statistical fluctuations in numerical simulations
with small N produce effects that can be shown to be
comparable in size with those induced by the ambiguity
of the impulsive terms in Eqs. (II.3), we conclude that the
predictions of mean field theory are acceptably accurate
as far as we are concerned. For this reason, in the sequel
we adopt one integration scheme, specifically, the explicit
one (it has a better match with numerical simulations, as
seen a posteriori), unless otherwise stated.
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Fig. 2 – [color online] (a) Time evolution of nA(t) for αB = αAB = 0.3 and τ = 1.0, 1.6, 2.2, 3.3; (b) time evolution of
nB(t) for the same choice of parameters. In both plots, continuous lines correspond to the explicit integration scheme
[Eqs. (II.7], while dashed lines correspond to the implicit integration scheme [Eqs. (II.8)].
Independently of the adopted scheme, we observe in
Fig. 2 two possible asymptotic behaviors for the opinion
densities: either nA(t) → 1 and accordingly nB(t) → 0
as t→∞ (this occurs, e.g., for τ = 1.0, 1.6, 2.2) or both
densities keep on oscillating around finite values without
ever converging (this occurs, e.g., for τ = 3.3). For any
(αB, αAB) there exists a critical value τc of τ for which the
system switches from converging to consensus to end-
lessly oscillating. This critical value is the largest one
below which agents in state A overtake those in state B
at some point in time. For instance, for αB = αAB = 0.3
we have τc ' 2.55. In full generality, it makes sense to
define
t∗(αB, αAB, τ) = inf {t ∈ R+ :
nA(t) = nB(t)
∣∣ αB, αAB, τ } . (II.9)
If t∗ < +∞, the system goes to consensus on opinion
A with certainty. In principle, we could safely stop the
media campaign at t = t∗: the internal dynamics of the
binary NG would then guarantee that all agents carrying
opinion B are eventually converted to opinion A. In the
jargon of stochastic processes, t∗ is commonly referred to
as a first passage time. The overall number of messages
sent by media since the beginning of the game until t∗
amounts to
Nc(αB, αAB, τ) =
⌈
t∗(αB, αAB, τ)
τ
⌉
, (II.10)
where the ceiling function d · e takes into account that the
first message is sent by media at time t = 0. Intuitively,
Nc can be taken as a measure of the lowest economic cost
of the campaign.4 Fig. 3(a) shows a density plot of Nc for
αB = αAB = α. The plot highlights the existence of two
sharply separated phases: phase I corresponds to suc-
cessful campaigns, i.e. pairs (α, ν) for which Nc < +∞,
whereas phase II corresponds to unsuccessful campaigns,
i.e. pairs (α, ν) for which Nc = +∞. We observe that Nc
keeps low in a wide region of phase I, while it surges in
proximity of the critical line separating the two phases.
B. Approximate analytic solution for αB = αAB = α
Although Eqs. (II.3) cannot be solved analytically, it is
possible to derive an approximate formula for the critical
line. We said that if (α, ν) belongs to phase II, then the
opinion densities oscillate endlessly around asymptotic
average values. These are formally defined as
n¯X = lim
t→∞
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
nX(σ) dσ , X = A, B . (II.11)
The oscillations can be regarded as periodic equilibrium
states of the system, because their width is limited in
size. When crossing the critical line, the asymptotic av-
erage densities undergo a jump discontinuity. Hence, the
formula we are looking for can be read off as a singularity
4The reader might wonder why we do not use the macroscopic time
to consensus tconv in place of t∗ to define Nc. Indeed, for t∗ <
+∞ and t > t∗ the action of media makes the system converge to
consensus on opinion A at an exponential rate. Nevertheless, the
exact convergence is only asymptotic at the level of MFEs, hence
to define Nc in terms tconv we should formally introduce a cutoff
  1 and define operationally tconv as the first time at which
nA = 1 − . This would make Nc depend explicitly on . By
contrast, t∗ is well defined with no need for a cutoff.
7Fig. 3 – [color online] (a) Density plot of Nc for αB = αAB = α in the mean field approximation from numerical
integration of MFEs; the yellow dashed line represents the approximate analytic solution, Eq. (II.21); (b) average
asymptotic density n¯A from numerical integration in the explicit scheme (dashed lines), in the implicit one (dotted
lines), and from the approximate analytic solution (continuous lines).
in the analytic behavior of n¯A and n¯B. Since the system
never relaxes to a real dynamical equilibrium, charac-
terized by steady densities, we are not allowed to im-
pose asymptotic conditions dnX/dt = 0 simultaneously
for X = A, B in Eqs. (II.3). However, if (α, ν) belongs to
phase II, then integrating both sides over a period τ and
letting t→∞ yields, respectively,
0 = lim
t→∞
∫ t+τ
t
dnA
dt
(σ) dσ = τ
(
1− n¯A − 2n¯B + n¯2B
)
+ τ lim
t→∞
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
[n¯B − nB(σ)]2 dσ
+ α lim
t→∞
∫ t+τ
t
(1− nA − nB) (σ) δ (σmod τ) dσ ,
(II.12)
and
0 = lim
t→∞
∫ t+τ
t
dnB
dt
(σ) dσ = τ
(
1− n¯B − 2n¯A + n¯2A
)
+ τ lim
t→∞
1
τ
∫ t+τ
t
[n¯A − nA(σ)]2 dσ
− α lim
t→∞
∫ t+τ
t
nB(σ) δ (σmod τ) dσ . (II.13)
The first integral on the right-hand side of Eqs. (II.12)
and (II.13) measures the width of the oscillations at pe-
riodic equilibrium. For small values of τ , these are ex-
pected to be negligible in first approximation, hence,
dropping the integral from both equations should not
affect severely the average densities. The second inte-
gral on the right-hand side is ill defined, as we previously
explained. Whatever definition we adopt for it, it will
depend somehow on the opinion densities at times just
before and after the spike occurring between t and t+ τ .
In the assumption that the width of the oscillations is
small, it looks natural to replace this integral by the cor-
responding asymptotic average density. The two approx-
imations yield a simplified system of algebraic equations,
namely, 0 = τ
(
1− n¯A − 2n¯B + n¯2B
)
+ α (1− n¯A − n¯B) ,
0 = τ
(
1− n¯B − 2n¯A + n¯2A
)− α n¯B .
(II.14)
This system can be solved exactly. To this aim, we ob-
serve that the first equation depends linearly upon n¯A,
while the second one depends linearly on n¯B. Solving, for
instance, the first equation with respect to n¯A yields by
substitution
n¯B
[
τ3n¯3B − 2τ2(α+ 2τ)n¯2B
+τ(α+ 2τ)2n¯B − (τ + α)3
]
= 0 . (II.15)
The simple root n¯B = 0 yields in turn n¯A = 1. This so-
lution does not represent a state of periodic equilibrium,
in fact, it describes densities belonging to phase I. More-
over, two of the roots of the cubic polynomial in square
brackets are unphysical, hence they must be discarded.
8The third root, representing the physical solution, yields
n¯A = 1 +
ζ(α, τ)− α− 2τ
τ(τ + α)
ζ(α, τ) , (II.16)
n¯B =
ζ(α, τ)
τ
, (II.17)
with the auxiliary function ζ(α, τ) being given by
ζ(α, τ) =
4
3
τ +
2
3
α
− 1
12
(
1 + i
√
3
)
3
√
Γ + 12
√
∆
− 1
3
(
1− i
√
3
) (α+ 2τ)2
3
√
Γ + 12
√
∆
, (II.18)
Γ = 44 τ3 + 228 τ2α+ 276 τα2 + 100α3 , (II.19)
∆ = 3 (23α3 + 57 τα2 + 33 τ2α− 5 τ3)(τ + α)3 .
(II.20)
It will be noticed that ζ(α, τ) is in general a complex
function. In Appendix A, we prove that its imaginary
part vanishes exactly provided ∆ < 0. The latter con-
dition defines phase II within the limits of the approx-
imations yielding Eqs. (II.14). For ∆ > 0, ζ(α, τ) is
truly complex. In this case, Eqs. (II.16) and (II.17) do
not describe anymore physical states. In Fig. 3(b), we
compare the asymptotic average density n¯A in our ana-
lytic approximation with those obtained numerically via
the explicit and implicit integration schemes. Each line
on the plot stops for α such that (α, τ) belongs to the
(scheme dependent!) critical line on the phase diagram.
In the analytic approximation, this line corresponds to
∆ = 0, which is a polynomial equation. The root of ∆
describing to the phase transition reads as
αc(ν) =
1
23
(9 · 22/3 + 6 · 21/3 − 19) 1
ν
=
0.123745 . . .
ν
. (II.21)
In Fig. 3(a), this formula is represented by a yellow
dashed curve. As expected, the approximation is very
good for small τ and deteriorates progressively as τ in-
creases. In particular, for τ →∞, Eq. (II.21) is affected
by an unphysical divergence.
C. Approximate analytic solution for αB 6= αAB
For αB 6= αAB it is equally possible to approximate and
solve MFEs as discussed in the previous section. The
physics is the same and the generalization is straightfor-
ward, yet the algebra is a bit more complicated. The
quartic equation analogous to Eq. (II.15) reads as
n¯B
[
τ3n¯3B − 2τ2(αAB + 2τ)n¯2B + τ(αAB + 2τ)2n¯B
−(τ + αAB)2(τ + αB)
]
= 0 . (II.22)
The solution has the same analytic structure as in
Eqs. (II.16) and (II.17), i.e., the average densities at pe-
riodic equilibrium are given by
n¯A = 1 +
ζ(αB, αAB, τ)− αAB − 2τ
τ(τ + αAB)
ζ(αB, αAB, τ) ,
(II.23)
n¯B =
ζ(αB, αAB, τ)
τ
, (II.24)
while the auxiliary function ζ(αB, αAB, τ) now reads as
ζ(αB, αAB, τ) =
4
3
τ +
2
3
αAB
− 1
12
(
1 + i
√
3
)
3
√
Γ + 12
√
∆
− 1
3
(
1− i
√
3
) (αAB + 2τ)2
3
√
Γ + 12
√
∆
, (II.25)
Γ = 44τ3 + 120τ2αAB + 60τα
2
AB − 8α3AB
+ 108αBτ
2 + 216ταBαAB + 108αBα
2
AB , (II.26)
∆ = 3
(−4α3AB + 27αBα2AB + 3τα2AB + 54ταBαAB
+6τ2αAB + 27τ
2αB − 5τ3
)
(τ+αB)(τ+αAB)
2 .
(II.27)
As in the special case αB = αAB, a phase transition occurs
for ∆ = 0, yet this equation describes in the most general
case a critical surface on the three-dimensional phase di-
agram (αB, αAB, ν). Since αB and αAB are homogeneous
quantities in that they measure the effectiveness of the
impulsive perturbation, we choose to represent the crit-
ical surface by solving the equation ∆ = 0 with respect
to τ . Accordingly, we find
ν−1c (αB, αAB) =
9
5
αB +
2
5
αAB +
3
5
3
√
Θ + 10
√
H
+
3
5
αAB
2 + 14αBαAB + 9αB
2
3
√
Θ + 10
√
H
, (II.28)
9(e)
Fig. 4 – [color online] (a–d) Phase diagram in the mean field approximation from numerical integration of MFEs; (e)
critical surface in the analytic approximation of Eq. (II.28); the intersection of the surface with the plane αB = αAB is
described by Eq. (II.21).
Θ = 29αBα
2
AB − α3AB + 63α2BαAB + 27α3B , (II.29)
H = −α5ABαB + α2Bα4AB + α3ABα3B . (II.30)
Fig. 4 shows a sequence of density plots of Nc analo-
gous to Fig. 3(a), corresponding, respectively, to αAB =
2αB, 4αB (a), (b) and αB = 2αAB , 4αAB (c), (d). It also
shows the critical surface described by Eq. (II.28) (e).5
All in all, the plots suggest that the phase structure of
5The reader will notice that letting αB = αAB = α in Eq.(II.28)
yields, α = 5
9·22/3+12·21/3+11
1
νc(α)
. There is no contradiction
with Eq. (II.21), since it holds 1
5·23 (9 · 22/3 + 6 · 21/3 − 19) ·
(9 · 22/3 + 12 · 21/3 + 11) = 1.
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the model is much more sensitive to αB than to αAB. This
is intuitively understood by recalling that each message
sent by media transfers a fraction of agents from state
B to state AB and from state AB to state A. If we even
switch off αAB, part of the agents brought to state AB
by media moves subsequently to state A owing to the in-
ternal dynamics of the binary NG. The continual action
of media eventually leads the system to global consensus
on opinion A. The only effect of choosing αAB < αB for
given τ is represented by a mild increase of Nc. By con-
trast, if we switch off αB, the system stays forever in the
initial state with no dynamics whatsoever. In particular,
in Fig. 4 we have
Nc(αB, αAB, τ)|αB=αAB
. Nc(αB, αAB, τ)|αB=2αAB
. Nc(αB, αAB, τ)|αB=4αAB
 Nc(αB, αAB, τ)|αAB=2αB
 Nc(αB, αAB, τ)|αAB=4αB . (II.31)
D. Dependence upon the initial conditions
The phase diagram for αB = αAB = α is character-
ized by a minimum value α0 of α below which the media
campaign never succeeds, independently of τ ≥ 1. We
should regard α0 as an absolute effectiveness threshold
for the action of media. Formally, α0 is defined by
α0 = min {α ∈ R+ :
t∗(αB, αAB, τ)
∣∣
αB=αAB=α
< +∞ for τ ≥ 1
}
= min {α ∈ R+ :
t∗(αB, αAB, 1)
∣∣
αB=αAB=α
< +∞
}
, (II.32)
where the rightmost expression follows from the mono-
tonic behavior of the critical line separating the phases
of successful and unsuccessful campaigns. In Sec. II B
we found that α0 = 0.1237 . . . with good approximation.
Although having α0 > 0 is phenomenologically encour-
aging (after all, not all media campaigns succeed in real
life. . . ), its actual value looks somewhat unrealistic, since
hardly could one imagine that a single real TV or radio
spot is able to systematically convince about 12% of the
population. However, we argue that this value is not
independent of the initial state of the system. So far,
we assumed nB(0) = 1, which is an extreme condition.
If we instead assume nB(0) < 1, the effort required to
Fig. 5 – [color online] density plot of α0 as a
function of the initial densities.
persuade the whole population to share opinion A de-
creases. Hence, the effectiveness threshold, that we now
regard as a function α0 = α0(nA(0), nB(0)), decreases
too. In Fig. 5 we show a density plot of α0. Recall that
nA(0) + nB(0) = 1 − nAB(0) ≤ 1, therefore α0 is defined
only in the lower triangular half of the plot. This region
splits up into two symmetric triangles. In the upper one
we have nA(0) > nB(0), hence the system converges cer-
tainly to consensus on opinion A with no need for a media
campaign. Accordingly, we have α0 = 0 in this region.
By contrast, in the lower triangle we have nA(0) < nB(0),
therefore media must do a real job to make opinion A pre-
vail on opinion B. Indeed, here we have α0 > 0. The dis-
tribution of colors in the plot suggests that α0 is a smooth
function of the initial densities. It also suggests that α0
is actually a function of nB(0)−nA(0) with good approx-
imation. This is reasonable, because nB(0) − nA(0) rep-
resents the fraction of agents that must be persuaded to
change opinion before the media campaign can be safely
stopped. Finally, the map shows that α0 has its absolute
maximum at nB(0) = 1.
Although Fig. 5 looks perfectly intuitive and some-
what unexciting from a theoretical standpoint, its prac-
tical usefulness should not be undervalued. Consider in-
deed whatever real situation in which the model we are
discussing might have a chance to be usefully applied.
Before starting any media campaign, it would look wise
to make a poll and get informed about what people ac-
tually think. Based on the outcome of the poll, Fig. 5
provides an estimate of the lowest effectiveness the media
campaign should have in order to succeed.
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Fig. 6 – [color online] density plot of the average value 〈Nc〉 for αB = αAB = α and for various network topologies.
Plots on the left column correspond to N = 200, whereas plots on the right column correspond to N = 500.
E. Agents on complex networks
We finally compare the mean field approximation of
the model with numerical simulations of it. In Figs. 6(a)
and 6(b) we report density plots of the mean value 〈Nc〉
as obtained from simulations on a CG with N = 200
(a) and N = 500 (b). Each data point in the plots
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was produced by averaging 100 independent measures of
Nc. White points correspond to 〈Nc〉 > 10 000, a thresh-
old above which simulations were forcedly arrested. The
dashed vertical line in correspondence of ν = 0.05 rep-
resents a frequency cutoff below which simulations were
too expensive given our computational budget. The yel-
low dotted line, reported for the reader’s convenience,
reproduces Eq. (II.21). The light stripe separating the
dark-colored (blue) domain from the white one is a nar-
row transition region across which Nc surges. Its width
shrinks mildly as N increases, thereby signaling that the
crossover to large Nc becomes gradually steeper as the
thermodynamic limit is approached. For a reason that
will become clear in a while, we emphasize the lower
boundary of the crossover by a continuous black line.
This appears to be closer to the yellow dotted line for
N = 500 than for N = 200. A perfect coincidence is
expected for ν & 0.5 as N →∞, as Fig. 3(a) suggests.
We recall that the CG is a totally unphysical network
in that its nodes become infinitely connected in the ther-
modynamic limit. To get an idea of the phase structure
in (more) realistic setups, we consider two network mod-
els for which the average number of nearest neighbors 〈k〉
keeps finite as N → ∞, namely, the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER)
and the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) graphs. On complex net-
works the imbalance between the absolute pervasiveness
of the external field and the finite average connectivity of
the agents results in a kind of trivialization of the phase
diagram as 〈k〉 decreases: the region corresponding to
large 〈Nc〉 [analogous to the white region in Figs. 6(a)
and 6(b)] keeps stable in the thermodynamic limit at
fixed 〈k〉 but narrows increasingly as 〈k〉 decreases. Re-
sults are displayed in Figs. 6(c)-6(f). Plots were obtained
according to the same recipe adopted for numerical sim-
ulations on the CG. For both ER and BA networks we
chose 〈k〉 = 4, 10, 20. In particular, the background col-
ors in the plots represent 〈Nc〉 for 〈k〉 = 4 while the black
lines reproduce (from bottom to top) the lower boundary
of the crossover regions corresponding to 〈k〉 = 4, 10, 20
and the CG. For the sake of completeness, we also re-
port the yellow dotted line representing Eq. (II.21). By
comparing the plots with N = 200 (left) to those with
N = 500 (right), we just conclude that the phase tran-
sition persists in the thermodynamic limit at fixed 〈k〉.
The overall convergence of the phase diagram as N in-
creases looks moderately fast, independently of whether
the degree distribution is homogeneous (ER network) or
heterogeneous (BA network). For both ER and BA net-
works the black lines shift upwards as N increases. As
anticipated, 〈k〉 turns out to be the most important net-
work parameter, while the specific topology of the net-
work connections appears to play a minor role. This
is further confirmed by numerical simulations on two-
dimensional square lattices (2D LAT) with N chosen as
close as possible to N = 200, 500. On these networks
we have 〈k〉 = 4. Results are shown in Figs. 6(g) and
6(h). Phases look similar to those observed on ER and
BA networks with equal 〈k〉. In consideration of the ex-
ploratory character of this paper, we do not present an
in-depth analysis of the residual differences of phase dia-
grams corresponding to networks with different topology
but equal 〈k〉.
All in all, the dependence of the phase diagram upon
〈k〉 appears as an effect of the competition between the
physical time scales characterizing the model, namely,
the period τ of the media campaign and the time to con-
sensus tconv of the binary NG. It is known from Ref. [67]
that tconv increases as 〈k〉 decreases, although the anal-
ysis of Ref. [67] refers to the complete NG and not to
its binary version (in the former tconv includes an ini-
tial transient during which agents invent names and a
following stage during which they build up correlations,
whereas in the latter these are both absent). The natural
tendency to consensus of the NG dynamics is expected
to play as a resilience factor hampering the media action
in the beginning, when agents tend to reestablish consen-
sus on opinion B after each interaction with the external
field. The longer the time to consensus, the stronger the
expected influence of media.
III. PERIODIC EQUILIBRIUM WITH TWO
COMPETING EXTERNAL FIELDS
In the second part of the paper we study the system
under the influence of two competing external fields. As
previously, we consider N agents interacting according to
the dynamics of the binary NG, but now we assume that
half of the agents are initially in state A and the rest are
in state B. We represent media as two additional fictitious
agents MA and MB, both connected to the whole popu-
lation and advertising opinions A and B, respectively.
When interacting with the agents, media always play the
role of speaker. The basic rules for the media-agent inter-
actions are reported in Table II. We also assume that MA
(MB) broadcasts a message every TA = τAN (TB = τBN)
agent-agent interactions, with τA ≥ 1 (τB ≥ 1). Finally,
we assume that MA broadcasts the first message at time
t = 0, while MB does it at macroscopic time t = tdel with
0 ≤ tdel ≤ τB. The media action is now parametrized by
the 7-tuple (βB, βAB, γA, γAB, νA, νB, φ) with νA = 1/τA,
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before interaction after interaction before interaction after interaction
MA → L MA − L MB → L MB − L
A
A→A A−A with prob. 1 B B→ B B− B with prob. 1
A
A→ B A−AB with prob. βB B B→A B−AB with prob. γA
A
A→AB A−A with prob. βAB B B→AB B− B with prob. γAB
TABLE II – Table of media-listener interactions (MA = media broadcasting opinion A, MB = media broadcasting
opinion B, L = listener).
νB = 1/τB and φ = tdel/τB. Owing to the high dimension-
ality of the parameter space, studying the model is more
complicated than we did in Sec. II. First of all, whatever
choice of parameters we make the system never relaxes
to a steady state. Even if consensus is reached on either
opinion A or B at some point in time, the subsequent ac-
tion of the other media always reintroduces disagreement
among the population. In full generality, MFEs read
n˙A =
(
1− nA − 2nB + n2B
)
+βAB (1− nA − nB) δ(tmod τA)
−γA nA δ[(t− tdel) mod τB] ,
n˙B =
(
1− nB − 2nA + n2A
)
+γAB (1− nA − nB) δ[(t− tdel) mod τB]
−βB nB δ(tmod τA) ,
(III.1)
and the initial conditions we impose on them are
nA(0) = nB(0) = 1/2 . (III.2)
Our strategy for studying the equilibrium states of the
system is as follows: we first consider the plane (α, ν) of
highest symmetry, corresponding to βB = βAB = γA =
γAB = α, νA = νB = ν and φ = 0; then, we depart
from it by removing in turn each of these three symme-
try conditions. Such an approach yields only a partial
understanding of the full structure of the model, yet it is
sufficient to let non-trivial phenomenological aspects of
it emerge. Similarly to what we did in Sec. II, we first
study the system in the mean field approximation, then
we consider agents on finite networks with CG, ER, BA
and 2D LAT topologies. We anticipate that since the
equilibrium densities observed on different complex net-
works cannot be well displayed on a single figure, such
as we did in Fig. 6 for the case of one external field, we
place all plots referring to simulations with νA 6= νB and
φ 6= 0 in Ref. [68] for the sake of readability.
On the highest-symmetry plane we have n¯A =
n¯B ≡ n¯ (by symmetry!). The analytic approxima-
tions discussed in Sec. II B yield a condition of peri-
odic equilibrium, represented by the algebraic equation
n¯2 + (1 + αν)(1− 3n¯) = 0. This in turn yields
n¯ =
3
2
(1 +αν)− 1
2
√
9(1 + αν)2 − 4(1 + αν) . (III.3)
We thus see that n¯ is a function of the product 0 < αν <
1 and accordingly it belongs to the interval 0.35424 . . . =
3 − √7 ≤ n¯ ≤ (3−√5)/2 = 0.381964 . . . . The range of
n¯ is extremely limited in size for all α and ν. In Fig. 7
we report a density plot of n¯ obtained by numerically
integrating Eqs. (III.1). The agreement with the analytic
estimate is rather good but not perfect, especially for
α ' 1, where the ambiguity of the impulsive terms in
MFEs becomes more relevant. Apart from this, the plane
of highest symmetry is not particularly interesting.
A. Competing external fields with different
frequencies
We now consider the case where βB = βAB = γA =
γAB = α and tdel = 0 but τA 6= τB. For each α = α∗,
the system lives on a plane (νA, νB) parallel to the plane
(νˆA, νˆB) generated by the coordinate axes νˆA and νˆB. This
plane intersects the highest-symmetry plane along the
line (α∗, ν). In full generality, for τA 6= τB the system
does not feature a periodic behavior. However, the ex-
istence of a periodic equilibrium is guaranteed whenever
it is possible to find two integers kA and kB such that
kAτA = kBτB, i.e., whenever τA/τB ∈ Q. Assuming that
kA and kB are the lowest integers fulfilling this property,
we conclude that the system relaxes to periodic equilib-
rium with period τ = kAτA = kBτB. If τA ∈ Q and
τB ∈ Q, then τA/τB ∈ Q too. In the end, since Q is dense
in R, we can safely restrict ourselves to τA, τB ∈ Q. No-
tice that τ can be much larger than both τA and τB: for
instance, if τA = 1.0 and τB = 1.1, then τ = 11.0. To
make the reader confident that this is correct, in Fig. 8
we show the behavior of the opinion densities correspond-
ing to this choice of periods for α = 0.3 as obtained from
numerical integration of Eqs. (III.1). For τA 6= τB, the
exchange symmetry n¯A ↔ n¯B is broken, but the system
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Fig. 7 – [color online] Average densities
n¯A = n¯B ≡ n¯ at periodic equilibrium on the
highest-symmetry plane.
is still symmetric under the joint exchange n¯A ↔ n¯B,
τA ↔ τB. Obviously, the average densities at periodic
equilibrium are still defined by Eq. (II.11) with τ being
correctly interpreted.
For τA > τB it is natural to expect that n¯A < n¯B and
the other way around. In other words, if MA broadcasts
with lower frequency than MB, it should also be less effec-
tive. Moreover, the larger the ratio τA/τB, the larger the
expected ratio n¯B/n¯A. This is what we meant by naive
expectation in the Abstract of the paper. It turns out,
however, that things are not always as simple as naively
expected. In Fig. SM2 of Ref. [68] we report density plots
of n¯A and n¯B corresponding to α = 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, ob-
tained from numerical integration of Eqs. (III.1). Due
to limitations in our computational budget, we could
only perform simulations for 0.5 ≤ νA, νB ≤ 1.0. We
notice the presence of two stripes, parallel and close to
the symmetry diagonal, where the average opinion densi-
ties are unexpectedly swapped. The starting point of the
stripes shifts progressively to lower frequencies along the
main diagonal as α increases (in fact, the choice of α in
Fig. SM2 of Ref. [68] was made to highlight the shifting
effect). Over the rest of the plots, n¯A and n¯B are qualita-
tively as common sense suggests. As a check, in Fig. SM3
of Ref. [68] we plot the same quantities measured in nu-
merical simulations on a CG with N = 16 000.6 Each
data point here was produced by averaging the opinion
6Whenever MA and MB broadcast their messages at the same time
along the simulation, we let MA act before MB with probability 1/2
for each agent and the other way around. This recipe guarantees
coincidence at a macroscopic level and thus ensures that no advan-
Fig. 8 – [color online] Time evolution of the
opinion densities for βB = βAB = γA = γAB = 0.3,
tdel = 0, τA = 1.0, and τB = 1.1 as obtained from
numerical integration of Eqs. (III.1).
densities along 10 periods after an appropriate transient,
so as to be sure that the system was at periodic equilib-
rium and the stochastic fluctuations, continuously per-
turbing its behavior, were averaged out. We observe a
smooth contour surrounding the stripes, that is absent
in the mean field approximation. The contour is a finite
size effect: it narrows progressively as N increases, while
the profile of the stripes becomes gradually sharper. The
choice of N in Fig. SM2 of [68] follows from the need
to check the predictions of the mean field approximation
on the largest graph affordable with our computational
resources, so as to be as close as possible to the thermo-
dynamic limit.
To obtain an estimate of the frequencies correspond-
ing to the starting point of the stripes, we approxi-
mate Eqs. (III.1) at periodic equilibrium as explained
in Sec. II B. This yields
0 = τ
(
1− n¯A − 2n¯B + n¯2B
)
+kAα (1− n¯A − n¯B)− kBα n¯A ,
0 = τ
(
1− n¯B − 2n¯A + n¯2A
)
+kBα (1− n¯A − n¯B)− kAα n¯B .
(III.4)
As already discussed, τ is an irregular function of τA and
τB, hence, the reader should not expect Eqs. (III.4) to
yield an overall description of the system consistent with
full MFEs or numerical simulations, except along the
tage is given to one external field over the other. The problem does
not occur in the mean field approximation.
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Fig. 9 – [color online] (a) Structure of the solutions to Eq. (III.5) for α = 0.3; (b) νcusp as obtained by analytic
arguments, MFEs, and numerical simulations.
main diagonal, where τ (= τA = τB) changes smoothly.
It is anyway interesting to see what Eqs. (III.4) predict
off the main diagonal. By solving the first of them with
respect to n¯A and by then inserting the resulting expres-
sion into the second of them, we get a quartic equation
for n¯B, viz.,
a4 n¯
4
B + a3 n¯
3
B + a2 n¯
2
B + a1 n¯B + a0 = 0 , (III.5)
with coefficients
a4 = τ
3 ,
a3 = −4τ3 − 2kAτ2α ,
a2 = 4τ
3 + (4kA − 3kB)τ2α
+(k2A − k2B − kAkB)τα2 ,
a1 = −τ3 + 3(kB − kA)τ2α
−(3k2A + k2B + kAkB)τα2
−(k3A + k3B + 2kAk2B + 2kBk2A)α3 ,
a0 = 2k
2
Bτα
2 + k2B(kA + kB)α
3 .
(III.6)
Depending on τA and τB this equation has four real so-
lutions or two real and two complex solutions, as shown
in Fig. 9 (a) for α = 0.3. The region with four real
solutions splits across the symmetry diagonal into two
halves, roughly corresponding to the stripes of Fig. SM2
of Ref. [68]. Except for one solution that is everywhere
larger than one and is thus unphysical, we have no the-
oretical argument to choose the right solution in this re-
gion out of the remaining three. The cusp, highlighted
by a red bullet on the plot, is located at νA = νB = νcusp.
This can be calculated exactly. We find
νcusp =
1
1 + 2
√
2
1
α
. (III.7)
The reader is referred to Appendix B for a detailed dis-
cussion of Eq. (III.5) and a derivation of Eq. (III.7). In
Fig. 9 (b) we compare our analytic estimate of νcusp
with the one obtained from numerical integration of
Eqs. (III.1) and from numerical simulations. Results
from MFEs are in excellent agreement with numerical
data, while the analytic estimate is 15–20% higher.
In Figs. SM4–SM10 of Ref. [68] we plot the average
opinion densities on ER and BA networks with N =
16 000 and 〈k〉 = 4, 10, 20 and also on a two-dimensional
lattice with N = 100 × 100. Similar to what we found
in Sec. II, periodic equilibria turn out to depend on the
network topology mainly via the average degree of the
agents, while the specific shape of the degree distribu-
tion appears to be secondary. As can be seen by look-
ing at the figures sequentially, the starting point of the
stripes shifts to lower frequencies as 〈k〉 decreases, while
the overall behavior of the densities becomes smoother.
In particular, for 〈k〉 = 4 the stripes go off the plot region.
We refer the reader to Sec. III D for an interpretation of
the physical origin of the stripes.
B. Competing external fields with different
effectiveness
We then consider the case where τA = τB = τ = 1/ν
and tdel = 0 but βB = βAB = β and γA = γAB = γ with
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Fig. 10 – [color online] (a), (b) Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for βB = βAB = β and
γA = γAB = γ from numerical integration of MFEs for τ = 2.0; (c), (d) same quantities from numerical simulations on a
CG with N = 16 000.
β 6= γ. For each ν = ν∗, the system lives on a plane
(β, γ) which is neither parallel to the plane (βˆB, γˆA) gen-
erated by the coordinate axes βˆB and γˆA (this would cor-
respond to having βAB = const. and γAB = const.) nor
parallel to the plane (βˆAB, γˆAB) generated by the coordi-
nate axes βˆAB and γˆAB (this would correspond to having
βB = const. and γA = const.). Anyway, this plane inter-
sects the highest-symmetry plane along the line (α, ν∗)
for β = γ = α. In this setup the action of the external
fields is perfectly synchronous.
In Fig. 10 we report density plots of n¯A and n¯B
at periodic equilibrium, from numerical integration of
Eqs. (III.1) [Figs. 10(a) and 10(b)] and from numeri-
cal simulations on a CG with N = 16 000 [Figs. 10(c)
and 10(d)], both corresponding to τ = 2.0. In this case,
the behavior of the system is qualitatively as one would
naively expect: in the area above the symmetry diagonal,
where MB is more effective than MA, we have n¯B > n¯A
and vice versa. No region with swapped densities is ob-
served. Interestingly, we notice a discontinuity of the
average densities across the symmetry diagonal, which is
very strong for small values of β = γ. The discontinuity
fades out for larger values of the effectiveness parame-
ters. The edge of it, i.e. the point of largest effectiveness
along the main diagonal for which it can be observed, de-
pends on τ : both MFEs and numerical simulations show
that it shifts upwards as τ increases. It is possible to
estimate the coordinates β = γ = βdisc of this point in
the same way as we did for νcusp in Sec. III A. The ana-
lytic approximations discussed in Sec. II B now yield the
system
0 = τ
(
1− n¯A − 2n¯B + n¯2B
)
+β (1− n¯A − n¯B)− γ n¯A ,
0 = τ
(
1− n¯B − 2n¯A + n¯2A
)
+γ (1− n¯A − n¯B)− β n¯B .
(III.8)
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By solving the first of Eqs. (III.8) with respect to n¯A
and by then inserting the resulting expression into the
second of them, we obtain another quartic equation for
n¯B, namely,
a˜4n¯
4
B + a˜3n¯
3
B + a˜2n¯
2
B + a˜1n¯B + a˜0 = 0 , (III.9)
with coefficients reading as
a˜4 = τ
3 ,
a˜3 = −4τ3 − 2τ2β ,
a˜2 = 4τ
3 + τ2(4β − 3γ) + τ(β2 − γ2 − βγ) ,
a˜1 = −τ3 + 3τ2(γ − β)− τ(3β2 + γ2 + γβ)
−(β3 + γ3 + 2βγ2 + 2γβ2) ,
a˜0 = 2τγ
2 + γ2(β + γ) .
(III.10)
We can solve this equation in the same way as explained
in Appendix B. In doing it, we meet the same kind of
problems we discussed in relation to Eq. (III.5). In par-
ticular, the geometric structure of the solutions is qual-
itatively similar to Fig. 12 with νA and νB replaced by
β and γ, respectively. We notice that letting γ = β in
Eqs. (III.8) yields the same system as obtained by let-
ting τA = τB in Eqs. (III.4). Therefore, the point βdisc of
largest effectiveness for which the average densities are
discontinuous across the symmetry diagonal is immedi-
ately seen to be given by
βdisc =
τ
1 + 2
√
2
. (III.11)
For instance, for τ = 2.0 we have βdisc = 0.522 . . ., which
is about 20% higher than the value observed in Fig. 10,
in perfect analogy with the results of Sec. III A. Owing to
the absence of unexpected results in MFEs and numerical
simulations on the CG, in this case we did not extend the
analysis to complex networks.
C. Competing external fields with relative time
shift
We finally consider the case where τA = τB = τ = 1/ν
and βB = βAB = γA = γAB = α but φ = tdel/τ 6= 0.
For each ν = ν∗, the system lives on a plane (α, φ) that
is not parallel to any coordinate plane, just like we had
in Sec. III B. This plane intersects the highest-symmetry
plane along the line (α, ν∗).
Fig. 11 – [color online] time evolution of the
opinion densities for βB = βAB = γA = γAB = 0.3,
τA = τB = 4 and tdel = 0.8 as obtained by
numerical integration of Eqs. (III.1).
For 0 < φ < 1, MA broadcasts first while MB broad-
casts second within each period I` = [t`, t`+1). As a con-
sequence, MA enjoys a competitive advantage over MB.
At the beginning of the game the advantage is quanti-
fied by the difference nA(0
+)− nB(0+) = α/2. Since the
action of the external fields is periodic, it is natural to
expect that the initial imbalance of the population will
persist in time and will ultimately result in a predomi-
nance of opinion A over opinion B as t → ∞. It turns
out, actually, that also this naive expectation is wrong.
As an example, in Fig. 11 we show the time evolution of
the opinion densities for α = 0.3, τ = 4.0, and tdel = 0.8
from numerical integration of Eqs. (III.1). We notice
that nA(0
+) = 0.5 while nB(0
+) = 0.35, in agreement
with the formula given above. Within each period we ob-
serve two discontinuities affecting the opinion densities,
one pointing upwards and one downwards. Of course,
they are produced by the alternate action of the external
fields. Following a transient the system relaxes to peri-
odic equilibrium. For this choice of parameters it takes
exactly three periods for MB to definitely fill the starting
gap and make nB(t) > nA(t) for the rest of the time.
To clarify when the initial advantage of MA is unprof-
itable, in Fig. SM11 of Ref. [68] we report density plots
of n¯A and n¯B corresponding to τ = 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, obtained
by numerically integrating MFEs. All plots split quali-
tatively into two halves: on the left we have n¯B > n¯A, on
the right we have the opposite sign. A dashed black curve
separates these two regions. The splitting is exactly at
φ = 1/2 for sufficiently large α. The lowest point for
which the dashed curve is vertical shifts upwards as τ
increases. Below this point the average opinion densi-
ties have a discontinuity, whereas above it they feature a
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smooth behavior. Finally, the banded regions in the plots
represent domains of absolute majority, i.e. here we have
n¯X > 0.5, X = A, B. As a check, in Fig. SM12 of Ref. [68]
we plot the same quantities measured in numerical sim-
ulations on a CG with N = 16 000. Each data point
was produced according to the same recipe described in
Sec. III A. The discontinuity affecting the average opin-
ion densities for small α is now replaced by a smooth
transition as a result of the finite size of the graph. The
boundaries of the banded areas are more irregular than
in Fig. SM11 of Ref. [68]. This is also likely to be a finite
size effect and a result of stochastic fluctuations.
Unfortunately, we cannot use MFEs to derive analytic
predictions for this setup of parameters: the approxima-
tions described in Sec. II B are insensitive to any relative
time shift of the impulsive perturbations, as the reader
can easily figure out. We have no alternative strategy at
present but to study the system numerically.
In Figs. SM13–SM19 of Ref. [68] we plot the av-
erage opinion densities on ER and BA networks with
N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 4, 10, 20 and also on a two-
dimensional lattice with N = 100× 100. Once again, on
complex networks 〈k〉 turns out to be the most impor-
tant parameter affecting the equilibria of the system. In
particular, the vertical part of the dashed curve extends
downwards as 〈k〉 decreases, while the observed disconti-
nuity shrinks. Interestingly, on the 2D LAT topology the
discontinuity is absent for all values of τ , i.e., for small
α we have n¯A ' n¯B independently of φ. In Table III we
report the size of the areas of relative and absolute ma-
jority on the various network topologies. We notice that
meas(n¯B > n¯A) approaches 0.5 as 〈k〉 decreases, while
meas(n¯B > 0.5) reduces progressively in the same limit.
All in all, the system appears to be more balanced when
the agents have low connectivity. Again, we refer the
reader to Sec. III D for an interpretation of the results.
D. First vs. second mover. Who wins?
Marketing strategists know that firms can (and often
do) enjoy a competitive advantage over rivals when they
pioneer a new technology or enter a market with inno-
vative products. They call this the first-mover advan-
tage. Sometimes, first movers lose the competition for
various reasons, including free-riding of competitors, in-
ertia in reacting to environmental changes, etc. When
this happens, they refer to the overtaking of rivals as the
second-mover advantage. The idea was first formalized
in a renowned paper [69] and nowadays a huge literature
(both scientific and popular) on the subject exists. In
our theoretical setup, we have a competition among two
media and a gauge to measure which of them is more
convincing. In Secs. III A and III C we describe two dif-
ferent situations that can be traced back to a first-vs-
second-mover dynamics. On varying the model parame-
ters we observe periodic equilibrium states corresponding
to a predominance of the first mover or the second one.
Where do these come from? Since a full analytic solu-
tion of MFEs appears to be unattainable, we propose a
heuristic interpretation based on the limited information
ensuing from our numerical experiments.
Let us start with the setup of Sec. III C, where MA
(MB) plays as first (second) mover. We split each time
period I` into two disjoint intervals I`A = (t`, t` + tdel)
and I`B = (t` + tdel, t`+1). No media-agent interactions
occur during each of them, hence the evolution of the
opinions is free, i.e., it is exclusively governed by the in-
ternal rules of the NG. Since MA broadcasts its `th mes-
sage at t = t`, we regard I`A as a time during which the
population reacts to the persuasive power of MA. The
same holds for I`B and MB. Fig. SM11 of Ref. [68] tells
us that, for sufficiently large α, the second (first) mover
prevails for φ < 1/2 (φ > 1/2). We could call this di-
chotomous behavior the “φ = 1/2” rule. Since |I`A| = tdel
and |I`B| = τ − tdel, we conclude that the first mover
wins provided |I`A| > |I`B| and the other way around.
In other words, the winner is the external field that has
more time to influence the agents along their free evolu-
tion. Alternatively, we could say that the second mover
wins whenever he behaves like a fast follower, to borrow
another common expression from the jargon of business
strategy.
The above interpretation seems to be contradicted
by the behavior of the system for small α. In this
limit, the first mover predominates for φ > φ∗, with
φ∗ = φ∗(α, τ) < 1/2. The violation of the φ = 1/2
rule follows from the natural tendency of the internal
dynamics of the NG to unbalance the opinions densities
through the spread of consensus, while the competition
among the external fields tends to exert an overall bal-
ancing effect on them7. When the influence of the exter-
nal fields lessens (e.g., for α  1) the internal dynamics
becomes predominant and non-linear effects emerge: the
crossover between the regions of first- and second-mover
advantage turns into a phase transition and the system
relaxes more easily to a state of first-mover advantage
7Recall that media contributions to MFEs are linear in the opinion
densities, whereas agent-agent interactions contribute by quadratic
terms.
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τ topology 〈k〉 meas(n¯B > n¯A) meas(n¯A > 0.5) meas(n¯B > 0.5)
1.0
MFEs — 0.449 0.376 0.283
CG — 0.457 0.372 0.275
ER 20 0.461 0.355 0.264
ER 10 0.457 0.343 0.245
ER 4 0.481 0.265 0.213
BA 20 0.468 0.331 0.257
BA 10 0.474 0.311 0.245
BA 4 0.488 0.236 0.198
2D LAT — 0.489 0.229 0.198
2.0
MFEs — 0.418 0.507 0.349
CG — 0.422 0.504 0.343
ER 20 0.428 0.483 0.339
ER 10 0.425 0.476 0.322
ER 4 0.464 0.387 0.308
BA 20 0.439 0.463 0.338
BA 10 0.449 0.440 0.334
BA 4 0.478 0.358 0.307
2D LAT — 0.478 0.333 0.290
4.0
MFEs — 0.353 0.629 0.340
CG — 0.356 0.625 0.338
ER 20 0.367 0.608 0.341
ER 10 0.363 0.601 0.327
ER 4 0.427 0.488 0.340
BA 20 0.382 0.583 0.346
BA 10 0.400 0.552 0.350
BA 4 0.452 0.447 0.348
2D LAT — 0.457 0.420 0.334
TABLE III – Size of the regions of relative and absolute majority for tdel 6= 0 on various networks.
[nonetheless φ∗(α, τ) > 0 for all α > 0 and τ ≥ 1]. We
have a hint that this picture is correct upon looking at
the behavior of the system for large τ : as τ increases,
the influence of media similarly weakens, because opin-
ions have more time to freely evolve after each message
is broadcast. Fig. SM11 of Ref. [68] shows that for larger
τ the region where the φ = 1/2 rule is violated expands,
while Table III confirms that the area of first-mover ad-
vantage increases. The edge of the discontinuity of the
opinion densities raises proportionally to τ . An invari-
ance mechanism is at work here. Indeed, to restore the
loss of influence media undergo for larger τ , we need to
increase α proportionally, hence the edge of the discon-
tinuity shifts correspondingly. Another sign that we are
on the right track comes from the behavior of the system
on complex networks with small 〈k〉: as 〈k〉 decreases,
the influence of media strengthens because social cohe-
sion lessens (indeed the time to consensus in the NG
with no media increases). Figs. SM13–SM18 of Ref. [68]
show that for smaller 〈k〉 the region where the φ = 1/2
rule is violated shrinks, while Table III confirms that
the area of first-mover advantage decreases [recall that
meas(n¯A > n¯B) = 1−meas(n¯B > n¯A)].
To summarize, we started from a naive expectation,
according to which the first mover always wins because
he enjoys a competitive advantage over the second one.
A partial analysis of our simulations suggested a different
picture, in which it is not really important who broad-
casts first: what is important is that after each broad-
casting the population has sufficient time to positively
react and propagate consensus (φ = 1/2 rule). A com-
plete analysis of all available data finally showed that the
φ = 1/2 rule holds when both media exert a strong influ-
ence on the system, while non-linear effects emerge as a
result of the internal dynamics of the NG as the influence
of media becomes too weak.
Similar arguments allow to explain the origin of the
stripes of swapped densities observed in Figs. SM2–SM10
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of Ref. [68]. In the setup of Sec. III B, the agent dynamics
is symmetric under the exchange nA ↔ nB for 0 ≤ t <
min{τA, τB}, while the symmetry gets definitely broken
for t ≥ min{τA, τB}. For τA < τB we can regard MB as
broadcasting with the same frequency as MA but with
positive time delay tdel,` = `(τB − τA), increasing at each
subsequent period, i.e., for ` = 1, 2 . . . . Therefore, for
t ≥ τA, MA (MB) plays as first (second) mover. If τB −
τA  τA/2, the increase rate of tdel,` is very slow. In this
case MB behaves like a fast follower over many periods.
For the reasons explained in the previous paragraphs the
system relaxes to a periodic equilibrium in which MB
prevails over MA (second-mover advantage), while the
imbalance of the opinion densities becomes eventually too
large to be reversed after a number ` of periods such that
tdel,` ' τA/2. By contrast, if τB− τA . τA/2, the increase
rate of tdel,` is faster. In this case, a small number ` of
periods is sufficient to have tdel,` ' τA/2. If this occurs
before the system has relaxed to its ultimate equilibrium,
then MA has sufficient time to let the internal dynamics
of the agents work in its favor and MB has no chance
to overtake MA (first-mover advantage). Fig. SM11 of
Ref. [68] tells us that the transition from the former to
the latter behavior takes place sharply for τB − τA = τ∗,
with τ∗  τA/2. The above reasoning can be repeated
for τB < τA by simply exchanging MA ↔ MB.
What can we say about the dependence of the stripes
upon α and 〈k〉? By increasing α, the influence of the
external fields strengthens. According to our previous
considerations, the system should be more balanced. In-
deed, Fig. SM2 of Ref. [68] shows that the starting point
of the stripes shifts to lower frequencies, while the be-
havior of the average opinion densities across the main
diagonal becomes progressively smoother. The invari-
ance mechanism explained above works here as well. We
have already noticed that the system is governed by two
drivers: on the one hand we have the media action, ex-
erting a linearizing effect on the opinions; on the other
we have the internal dynamics of the NG, working to
unbalance the system through the spread of consensus.
By equally rescaling α, τA, and τB, the overall influence
of media is left nearly invariant and the physics does not
change. Correspondingly, the starting point of the stripes
shifts downwards along the main diagonal of Fig. SM2
of Ref. [68]. Similarly, by decreasing 〈k〉 the influence
of media strengthens. Again, the starting point of the
stripes shifts to lower frequencies by the same invariance
mechanism.
To summarize, the stripes of swapped densities can be
regarded as domains of second-mover advantage. They
are non-linear effects, emerging when the influence of me-
dia is weak. The above considerations allow to explain
how the starting point of the stripes shifts on varying α.
Yet, they cannot explain why they do have a starting
point. A full understanding of the dynamical mecha-
nism generating the stripes requires τ∗ = τ∗(α, τA, τB) to
be analytically known. Unfortunately, exact solutions to
MFEs are unattainable, whereas numerical ones are of
little help.
To conclude, we stress that the specific shape of the do-
mains observed in Figs. SM2–SM19 of Ref. [68] depends
expressly on the microscopic dynamics of the NG. It is
reasonable that other discrete-opinion models will feature
differently shaped regions of first- and second-mover ad-
vantage under the periodic action of competing external
fields. Our study describes a complex system in which a
non-trivial first-vs-second-mover dynamics emerges nat-
urally as a result of the collective behavior of interacting
agents.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have investigated the influence of peri-
odic external fields, representing mass media, on the dy-
namics of agents playing the binary naming game (NG).
Our major motivation for studying this was understand-
ing to what extent consensus can be exogenously directed
in the framework of an empirically grounded opinion
model. In this regard, we recall that theoretical predic-
tions derived from the NG have been shown to reproduce
correctly experimental results in Web-based live games
with controlled design [55]. In our study, we have found
that (i) a single external field is able to convert an entire
population of agents within a finite time provided it acts
with sufficiently high frequency and effectiveness and (ii)
two competing external fields, contending for supremacy,
lead the population to a complex periodic equilibrium.
We have worked out the phase structure of the model
in the mean field approximation, thereby providing evi-
dence that the large-scale dynamics is characterized by
non-linear effects and discontinuities in the parameter
space. Upon writing mean field equations, we have soon
realized that the impulsive terms representing the ac-
tion of the external fields make exact analytic solutions
unattainable. We have found, yet, that integrating mean
field equations over a time period allows to asymptoti-
cally simplify their algebraic structure, thus paving the
way to approximate predictions, that we have systemat-
ically derived. We have finally studied the phase struc-
ture of the model beyond the mean field approximation
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via numerical simulations on a complete graph (to eval-
uate finite size effects) and on various complex networks
(to examine how changing the network topology impacts
on results).
Although nontrivial, the dynamics in the presence of
one external field is rather intuitive. The system is driven
by two opposing forces: on the one hand the external
field compels the agents to abandon their original opin-
ion and to adopt the advertised one, on the other the
internal dynamics of the NG tends to restore the initial
configuration of the system. The clash between these two
forces results in a sharp transition from a phase where
opposite opinions stay forever in a state of periodic equi-
librium to one where consensus on the advertised opinion
is reached within a finite time. The existence of an ab-
solute threshold for the effectiveness parameter, below
which the action of the external field turns out to be
unsuccessful, seems to be the most important result of
our analysis, especially in relation to prospective appli-
cations of the model. Social cohesion, measured by the
average degree of the agents, turns out to be the main
factor of resilience to the pervasiveness of the external
field. It sets the absolute effectiveness threshold within
small corrections related to the specific topology of the
network links (e.g., the shape of the degree distribution).
More complex appears to be the dynamics in the pres-
ence of two competing external fields. The system is now
driven by three distinct forces: the field actions, com-
pelling the population to adopt one advertised opinion or
the other, and the internal dynamics of the NG, which dy-
namically amplifies consensus on the opinion prevailing
at any given time. Studying the system in full generality
looks more difficult. Therefore, we have examined three
ideal situations: (i) synchronous external fields with dif-
ferent effectiveness; (ii) external fields with equal effec-
tiveness and frequency but relative time shift; (iii) exter-
nal fields with equal effectiveness but different frequency
and no relative time shift. Case (i) is plain vanilla: the
most effective field always prevails over its competitor.
Cases (ii) and (iii) are more interesting. The condition
of equal effectiveness corresponds phenomenologically to
a situation of optimal competition: press agents on each
side are the best and work to prepare the best ads. Tim-
ing is now crucial. We have found two different dynamical
regimes. When media exert a strong influence (e.g., they
feature high effectiveness, high frequency, and/or social
cohesion is weak), the internal dynamics of the agents
becomes secondary: the system lives in a kind of linear
regime. In case (ii) the opinion prevailing at equilibrium
is the one that has systematically more time to spread
across the network before the opposite opinion is newly
advertised. For a reason explained in Sec. III D, we have
called this the “φ = 1/2” rule. In case (iii) the field
with higher frequency prevails over its competitor. By
contrast, when media exert a weak influence (e.g., they
feature low effectiveness, low frequency, and/or social
cohesion is strong) the internal dynamics of the agents
becomes predominant: the system lives in a nonlinear
regime. Phase transitions (discontinuities in the param-
eter space) and non-linear effects emerge.
In industrial competitions for which timing is a rel-
evant discriminating factor, it sounds pretty natural
to adopt a terminology, commonly used by marketing
strategists, according to which two competitors are re-
garded as first and second mover, depending on the
sequential order of their actions. The main message
emerging from our analysis is that in order to evaluate
first-vs-second-mover dynamics, considerations based on
well-established mechanisms (such as technological lead-
ership, preemption of scarce assets, switching costs, and
buyer choice under uncertainty [69]) could be insufficient
in specific conditions, because they do not take into ac-
count non-linear effects related to the spontaneous emer-
gence of social consensus as a result of population dy-
namics. In this regard, the model discussed in this paper
represents hopefully a useful abstraction.
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Appendix A REALITY OF ζ(α, τ) FOR ∆ < 0
We want to show that ζ(α, τ) ∈ R for (α, τ) belonging
to phase II. We assume ∆ = −|∆| < 0. Accordingly, we
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have
3
√
Γ + 12
√
∆ =
(
Γ + 12 i
√
|∆|
)1/3
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√
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arctan
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√|∆|
Γ
)]
= 6
√
Γ2 + 144|∆| · (C + iS) , (A.1)
where C and S denote, respectively, the cos and sin func-
tions. It is not difficult to show by explicit calculation
that
Γ2 + 144|∆| = [4(α+ 2τ)2]3 . (A.2)
Hence, it follows
3
√
Γ + 12
√
∆ = 2(α+ 2τ) · (C + iS) , (A.3)
Inserting this expression into ζ(α, τ) yields
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. (A.5)
We thus see that the imaginary part of ζ(α, τ) vanishes
provided ∆ < 0. Eq. (A.5) can be used for numerical
computations.
Appendix B STRUCTURE OF THE SOLUTIONS
TO EQS. (III.4)
We recall that general formulas for the roots of an al-
gebraic equation of fourth degree such as Eq. (III.5) (for
which a4 6= 0) are
(n¯B)1,2 = − a3
4a4
− Λ± 1
2
√
Σ+ , (B.1)
(n¯B)3,4 = − a3
4a4
+ Λ± 1
2
√
Σ− , (B.2)
with the coefficients Σ± and Λ being given by
Σ± = −4Λ2 − 2µ± ν
Λ
,
Λ =
1
2
√
−2
3
µ+
1
3a4
(
Ω +
∆0
Ω
)
(B.3)
and with
µ =
8a4a2 − 3a23
8a24
, (B.4)
ν =
a33 − 4a4a3a2 + 8a24a1
8a34
, (B.5)
Ω =
(
∆1 +
√
∆21 − 4∆30
2
)1/3
, (B.6)
∆0 = a
2
2 − 3a1a3 + 12a4a0 , (B.7)
∆1 = 2a
3
2 − 9a3a2a1 + 27a23a0
+ 27a4a
2
1 − 72a4a2a0 . (B.8)
By inserting the coefficients reported in Eq. (III.6)
into the above formulas, we compute the four solutions
(n¯B)1,...,4 to Eq. (III.5) numerically and then obtain the
corresponding densities (n¯A)1,...,4 by substitution in the
first of Eqs. (III.4). The resulting numbers are real or
complex depending on τA, τB and α. In Fig. 12 we report
density plots of the solutions for α = 0.3 in the regions
where they are real. For convenience, we have split the
parameter plane (νA, νB) into three regions R1, R2, and
R3. We observe that (n¯X)1 (X = A, B) is real within R3,
(n¯X)2 is real within R3 and in part of R2, (n¯X)3 is always
real and (n¯X)4 is real within R1, R3 and in part of R2.
Since (n¯X)2 is real in R2 where (n¯X)4 is complex and the
other way around, we conclude that we have two real and
two complex solutions in R1 and R2, while we have four
real solutions in R3. We also notice that (n¯X)3 > 1 for all
νA and νB, hence, we can leave it out. Accordingly, we
are left with just one real solution in R1 and R2, repre-
senting indeed the physical average densities at periodic
equilibrium.
In principle, (n¯X)1, (n¯X)2 and (n¯X)4 are all accept-
able in R3 (they are real, positive, and less than one).
Moreover, R3 contains part of the symmetry diagonal,
where we know that n¯A = n¯B = n¯, with n¯ given by
Eq. (III.3). It is clear from Fig. 12 that (n¯A)2 6= (n¯B)2
and (n¯A)4 6= (n¯B)4 for νA = νB, while it can be checked
with numerical precision that (n¯A)1 = (n¯B)1 = n¯ for
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Fig. 12 – [color online] Solutions to Eqs. (III.4) for α = 0.3 in the regions where they are real.
all νA = νB within R3. Therefore we conclude that the
correct solution along the symmetry diagonal in R3 is
represented by (n¯X)1. Out of the main diagonal we can-
not choose the right solution based on Fig. 12 alone, i.e.,
without a priori information. For instance, we could
split R3 into two halves along the symmetry diagonal,
then choose (n¯X)4 in the upper half and (n¯X)2 in the
lower one. This would yield no stripes of swapped den-
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sities but a discontinuity along the symmetry diagonal.
Otherwise, we could choose (n¯X)2 in the upper half and
(n¯X)4 in the lower one. This would yield two regions of
strongly reversed densities, resembling those observed in
numerical simulations. Finally, we could choose (n¯X)1 in
all R3. This would yield two stripes of weakly reversed
densities, likewise resembling the physical stripes. All
these choices are equally acceptable. We conclude that
the analytic approximation is ambiguous in R3.
In order to locate the cusp of R3, we consider (n¯X)1 in
the special case where τA = τB = τ , for which kA = kB =
1. It takes a few pages of scratch paper to work out Λ
and Σ+ along the symmetry diagonal. We find
Λ =
1
2
√
6τ3
√√√√pi0 + pi1 + [2 (pi2 + 3√pi3)]2/3(
pi2 + 3
√
pi3
)1/3 ,
(B.9)
Σ+ =
1
6τ3
[
2pi0 −
pi1 +
[
2
(
pi2 + 3
√
pi3
)]2/3(
pi2 + 3
√
pi3
)1/3
− 12
√
6 τ3/2(2α+ τ)3√√√√
pi0 +
pi1 +
[
2
(
pi2 + 3
√
pi3
)]2/3
(pi2 + 3
√
pi3)1/3
]
, (B.10)
with
pi0 = 2τ
(
5α2 + 10ατ + 4τ2
)
(B.11)
pi1 = −24/3τ2
(
7α2 + 2ατ − τ2)
· (5α2 + 10ατ + 4τ2) , (B.12)
pi2 = τ
3
(
7α2 + 2ατ − τ2)2
· (22α2 + 32ατ + 11τ2) , (B.13)
pi3 = 3τ
6(2α+ τ)4
(
7α2 + 2ατ − τ2)3
· (9α2 + 14ατ + 5τ2) (B.14)
We checked these expressions against numerical results
from standard math libraries for solving quartic equa-
tions. In particular, Σ+ vanishes for 7α
2 + 2ατ − τ2 = 0,
i.e. for τ = 1/νcusp with νcusp given by Eq. (III.7), as a
consequence of
pi1|τ=1/νcusp = pi2|τ=1/νcusp
= pi3|τ=1/νcusp = 0 , (B.15)
2pi
3/2
0 |τ=1/νcusp = 12
√
6τ3/2(2α+ τ)3|τ=1/νcusp .
(B.16)
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Fig. SM1 – [color online] Synoptic table of networks and simulation parameters with figure numbers.
3Fig. SM2 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for τA 6= τB from numerical integration
of mean field equations in the explicit scheme.
4Fig. SM3 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for τA 6= τB from numerical simulations
on a complete graph with N = 16 000.
5Fig. SM4 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for τA 6= τB from numerical simulations
on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 20.
6Fig. SM5 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for τA 6= τB from numerical simulations
on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 10.
7Fig. SM6 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for τA 6= τB from numerical simulations
on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 4.
8Fig. SM7 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for τA 6= τB from numerical simulations
on Baraba´si–Albert networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 20.
9Fig. SM8 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for τA 6= τB from numerical simulations
on Baraba´si–Albert networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 10.
10
Fig. SM9 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for τA 6= τB from numerical simulations
on Baraba´si–Albert networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 4.
11
Fig. SM10 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for τA 6= τB from numerical
simulations on a two-dimensional lattice with N = 100× 100.
12
Fig. SM11 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for tdel 6= 0 from numerical integration
of MFEs in the explicit scheme. The black dashed curve separates regions of opposite relative majority. The banded
regions represent domains of absolute majority.
13
Fig. SM12 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for tdel 6= 0 from numerical simulations
on a complete graph with N = 16 000. The black dashed curve separates regions of opposite relative majority. The
banded regions represent domains of absolute majority.
14
Fig. SM13 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for tdel 6= 0 from numerical simulations
on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 20. The black dashed curve separates regions of opposite relative
majority. The banded regions represent domains of absolute majority.
15
Fig. SM14 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for tdel 6= 0 from numerical simulations
on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 10. The black dashed curve separates regions of opposite relative
majority. The banded regions represent domains of absolute majority.
16
Fig. SM15 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for tdel 6= 0 from numerical simulations
on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 4. The black dashed curve separates regions of opposite relative
majority. The banded regions represent domains of absolute majority.
17
Fig. SM16 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for tdel 6= 0 from numerical simulations
on Baraba´si–Albert networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 20. The black dashed curve separates regions of opposite
relative majority. The banded regions represent domains of absolute majority.
18
Fig. SM17 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for tdel 6= 0 from numerical simulations
on Baraba´si–Albert networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 10. The black dashed curve separates regions of opposite
relative majority. The banded regions represent domains of absolute majority.
19
Fig. SM18 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for tdel 6= 0 from numerical simulations
on Baraba´si–Albert networks with N = 16 000 and 〈k〉 = 4. The black dashed curve separates regions of opposite relative
majority. The banded regions represent domains of absolute majority.
20
Fig. SM19 – [color online] Average densities n¯A and n¯B at periodic equilibrium for tdel 6= 0 from numerical simulations
on a two-dimensional lattice with N = 100× 100. The black dashed curve separates regions of opposite relative majority.
The banded regions represent domains of absolute majority.
